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Oracle: Vertical Data Competitive Advantage

A Current Director at Deloitte, a leading Oracle Partner, shares insights about Oracle win rates against SAP:

"As the product improved, Oracle began to look more modern than SAP. SAP's S/4HANA is based on decades-old code. Oracle started with finance and expanded to a diverse set of applications, including supply chain and manufacturing. Their win rates began to improve. In recent years, Oracle hasn't feared SAP. For the last five years, Oracle has won any fair competition against SAP where Oracle was the incumbent. Their win rates were very high, probably over 75%. SAP would win if they were the incumbent or had the majority of the install base within a client. For example, clients like Ingersoll Rand or Eaton Corporation had numerous ERP systems, including Oracle and SAP. If SAP was dominant, they could argue for rolling it out everywhere, making it harder for Oracle to win - Director at Deloitte, Oracle Partner

And Oracle's potential data moat in an AI era:

"I think about their ability to generate necessary data. AI doesn't work without data; it's essential. Oracle has its own suite of reporting capabilities and tools, and they're collaborating with companies like Cohere. They're also working with others developing models. Oracle's strategy is to have the industry-standard data model for construction, retail, communications, government, and healthcare. There are a few industries they don't cover, like petrochemical and pharmaceutical, where they have limited presence. Oracle has the data model, and you need to tap into it to develop your generative AI infrastructure. Your generative model needs access to a data model, which is built on the applications infrastructure Oracle is assembling. They're creating unique products for each industry and commercial products in a single data model - Director at Deloitte, Oracle Partner

Adobe Pricing Power

A former Adobe Japan Director explores how the company leverages its pricing power:

"During the six or seven years I was at Adobe, we increased our product prices every two years by about 10% to 20%, depending on the situation. This price increment was the only way to expand revenue for Adobe Creative products. Customers, both in Japan and internationally, are hesitant about Adobe's price increases because they don't see the added value - Former Adobe Japan Director

And the impact on gross retention after price increases:

"Retention it's gradually decreasing. We used to have a 95% or 96% retention rate. However, with large, established industries moving away from Adobe products, the decrease in retention has been gradually growing - Former Adobe Japan Director

And how Figma negotiations impacted Adobe XD:

"We ceased licensing XD around 2019 and stopped selling it. We thought this was in preparation for acquiring Figma and selling it instead. But in 2023, just after I left Adobe, Figma finally decided not to sell. The negotiations broke down. My guess is that Figma probably never intended to sell to Adobe and wanted to compete against XD by negotiating with Adobe. By 2023, when they said no, XD had no market share. Now, Figma is the only tool in the market without competitors, and it has been very successful. Adobe has been losing ground in the creative tool market and now only has the choice of selling Figma instead of XD - Former Adobe Japan Director

These two interviews can be read alongside the following:

Nubank: Culture & NPV Discipline

A former Nubank Director on the company's underwriting process & culture:

"The decision criteria are relatively constant. The goal is to make decisions that are NPV positive, subject to some level of risk worsening on the margin. The amount of risk worsening might change slightly depending on the risk appetite. For example, you might want a 10%, 30%, or 50% cushion, which can vary based on macroeconomic conditions. But the core is having a good estimate of the lifetime unit economics of the data point. It's straightforward math. David wouldn't weigh in on the model, and he wouldn't weigh in on the risk appetite. I think he respected the process. That's a core principle at Capital One - don't interfere with credit, at that can lead to negative outcomes. There is respect for the level of the unit economics and allowing the process to determine the outcomes in terms of lending. - Former Director at Nubank

And the impact of the company losing its COO:

"I would say I'm not as optimistic as I was three weeks ago. I don't think losing Youssef is beneficial for the organization. It reduces the number of people willing to tell David the truth, which is ultimately a negative, especially in a risk management-oriented business. This doesn't mean there's no one left who will do it, but it does reduce that number - Former Director at Nubank

Sea Limited: The Shopee Brazil Playbook

A Former Shopee LATAM Country Manager on Shopee's expansion in Brazil:

"I presented my plan, saying that with a 0% commission, I would beat MELI in volume within 24 months. I was committed to this, but I needed the money. I expected to be told I was crazy and that we would negotiate to a common ground, maybe getting 20% of what I was asking for, which I was fine with. Surprisingly, the plan was approved as it was, not one cent less. However, I was asked one question that I remember very well. He said, if I approve this plan, how many sellers will you bring me by the end of two years? - Former Shopee LATAM Country Manager

On the initial traction in Brazil:

"The response was overwhelming. For example, it took me less than two months to have more sellers than Magalu, starting from zero. We prioritized the big sellers first. For those who said they didn't have time to open a store, we offered to do it for them. We integrated with systems like Correios and EBANX, and sellers were eager to take advantage of the zero percent commission. To cut a long story short, our 12-month budget was consumed in just 5 months. I was managing the P&L and investments, and we had to raise the commission from 0% to 6%. A few months later, it increased to 12%. After a year, we were already bigger. It took us 13 months to surpass Mercado Libre, not 24. By February 2022, Shopee had a higher transaction volume than Mercado Libre - Former Shopee LATAM Country Manager

On Shopee's international expansion strategy during the 2021 frenzy:

"And he said, no, no, Argentina is just to make MELI bleed. Forcing MELI to defend their market in Argentina will cause them to be distracted and to lose the other markets in LATAM. I don't care about Argentina. I'm just throwing money there. I said, we are halfway there in Brazil, still at a loss in terms of P&L. I suggested that we expand in LATAM that year, where there is some synergy. It would be easier for us to help manage LATAM from Brazil. Hold India, France, Poland, etc. Don't do that now. He said, since we began in Brazil six months ago, our market cap has moved from roughly $100 billion to $360 billion. I believe this was September 2021. We were already the third biggest ecommerce company in the world, very close to Alibaba, which was the second with a $500 billion market cap. At that time, Amazon was around $1.1 trillion. So we were about one-third of Amazon and more than 70% of AliExpress - Former Shopee LATAM Country Manager

QXO: Beacon Roofing M&A Blueprint

A former VP of Finance at Beacon Roofing explores why the US building product distribution market is still fragmented :

There's still a lot of smaller independent distributors, legacy distributors. Some of it is contractor loyalty. They've built a contractor base that is very loyal to that distributor, and they're going to stick with them. You don't see many new distributors starting out. For example, we acquired Shelter Distribution in 2006 in the Midwest, which was a big expansion for Beacon. Much of their management team left after the acquisition and started SRS about a year and a half to two years later. Ron Ross, Dan Tinker, and others from that business acquired smaller distributors and grew SRS. Two years ago, they were acquired by Home Depot. - Former VP of Finance at Beacon Roofing, QXO

And the economies of scale for larger incumbents:

The industry remains fragmented. We could plot all of Beacon's and our competitors' locations on a map. If we wanted to be the top distributor in a market like Florida, we would look at potential acquisitions, make introductions, or leverage existing relationships to discuss acquisitions. Larger distributors like Beacon, SRS, and ABC get better pricing and rebates due to volume, which smaller distributors don't receive. We could acquire a business and offer better pricing and margins. Sometimes existing management stays, or they seek an exit strategy, possibly to retire. Some older distributors, often second or third generation, want to exit, providing consolidation opportunities. - Former VP of Finance at Beacon Roofing, QXO

Wise: Platform Foundations From B2C to B2B

A Former Wise Director on the company culture:

"In my first meeting at TransferWise, Kristo walked into the meeting room. They were discussing a customer implementation plan when Kristo suggested building a specific module within the API for a customer, believing they would love it. The team respectfully disagreed, pointing out that he was wrong based on three data points they had noticed. They decided not to build what he suggested and instead continued with their plan, aiming to acquire another customer with different requirements. In my previous job at a bank, the entire team would have been fired for such disagreement, and the CEO's word would have been final. However, Kristo admitted the team was right. Not only did the team remain for two years, but they also openly disagreed with him, built what they wanted, sold to whom they wanted, and achieved their KPIs. They proved they were right and continued with their approach. This experience made me realize why I was there for several years - Former Director at Wise

And the foundations of the Wise Platform:

"Over the course of three weeks, I spoke to about 48 or 49 banks, leveraging my network. I manually tabulated the results and extracted insights. I concluded that what these banks wanted was beyond our capabilities and recommended shutting down the team. It was painful, but within 24 hours, I asked my team to leave, and they found other projects within the company. I developed a new thesis. We shouldn't focus on large banks but on players who would naturally use our solution, like fintech-first and fintech-native companies. These companies promised excellent service levels to their customers and couldn't afford to use SWIFT or wait for their banks to provide similar services. These were our prime customers. We then shifted our focus to similar fintech darlings, like Monzo in the UK and Starling, among others in the EU. It was a good idea and thesis, but executing it was challenging, and we weren't sure if it would work - Former Director at Wise

Rollins: Outpacing Rentokil - Organic Search & Local Scale

A Former Rollins VP shares insight into the Rentokil merger:

Two large companies with different cultures and values, international headquarters across an ocean, and a company not fully operational with ServiceMaster made this a challenging integration. I'm just giving my opinion. What they paid for it was supposed to be made up in synergies. I've had many calls about Rentokil, and my approach is not about consolidating branches for cost savings. It's about having the right branches in the right geographic areas to grow the business locally. Rentokil decided to pursue consolidation, tested it, and had some results. Recently, they reversed course after three years and are considering more satellite branches and locations. Pest control, like many services, is a local business. A global company needs a local presence to drive business from an owner and consumer standpoint. Google searches and local addresses play a role. - Former VP at Rollins

On how the mosquito product drove organic growth within Rollins:

"Another factor that has helped on the organic side with Rollins is the introduction of the mosquito product. Before 2018, it was sold more as a one-off. We really pushed to sell the mosquito product, achieving over a 30% growth rate. Like any business model, once we attached that second service, it improved retention and profitability for customers. When routes were managed properly, allowing the pest control technician to also provide mosquito services, it further enhanced profitability for that account. The mosquito product is the highest retention product that Rollins offers. By attaching it to pest control, it provided an additional opportunity for retention. I don't think ServiceMaster or Rentokil ever achieved that level of traction to ramp up and grow over time. This might be a differentiator from an organic standpoint- Former VP at Rollins