{audio:0:00:02} Rod, what does leadership mean to you?

{audio:0:00:07} I think being a leader commands that an individual creates a path for people, or the organization, to follow. By that, I mean establishing your usual objectives; a mission, a vision, a strategic plan. Literally, personally, from the leader, establishing a culture and exemplifying values. It’s also important to guide the organization to those plans. Actually, there are so many organizations that have done a great job, from the marketing perspective, for the organization, setting forth a vision and a plan and values and so forth. But so many times, leaders don’t guide the organization towards those. I think it’s key to execute upon, whatever you put together and that’s key to leadership.

{audio:0:01:10} Again, you can’t be a leader if you don’t have a set of followers. There would be nobody to lead. I think, creating that following is really important for the organization.

{audio:0:01:23} How did you go about in motivating or influencing others, to follow you?

{audio:0:01:32} It sounds a bit old school, but I think, rolling up the sleeves and participating in that. Not just setting forth a bunch of slides and posters and a few speeches here and there. But actually living the values and getting stuck in to help execute upon that plan. It doesn’t mean you have to do everything yourself. You do need to delegate and you do need to assign responsibilities and hold people accountable. Again, getting in the trenches and working with everybody, across the organization is critical. And communicating; constantly communicating, I think, helped in my career, to generate those followers.

{audio:0:02:16} What do you think that does, when you, as you said, roll up your sleeves and participate next to those followers?

{audio:0:02:25} I think it demonstrates to your employees, your co-workers, that you care about what they’re doing. Firstly, that you can understand a bit about what they’re doing and I also think it helps to build a bit of trust that you can share in what issues they may be facing, budgetary restraints, work challenges and so forth. I think it helps to build a little bit of collaboration, which is critical to leadership. You have to collaborate and, again, share with the employees, as best you can, what they might be going through. Additionally, as I said earlier, to help guide them towards the objectives.

{audio:0:03:07} Could you just set some context to when you joined Polarcus, as CEO?

{audio:0:03:14} The board of directors bought me in, as CEO, really, I would say, to help drive a bit of business acumen, bring some commercial aspects to the company. In terms of seismic acquisition companies, it was relatively new. It had been operational for about three years and my predecessor, who had an operations background, did a great job getting the company running, vessels on the water, operating crews on boards those vessels and so forth.

{audio:0:03:45} When I arrived, I looked at the organization as, wow, this is still in start-up mode when, in fact, it had been operational for three to four years. The whole organization, starting with the management team, the executive leadership team, was still working as though they were in start-up mode. I think the board recognized that. The industry, which I’ll get to, was starting to crumble and become very, very challenging. Again, I think bringing some business acumen, some market perspective to the organization, was really the challenge that I saw, when I walked in, and the reason the board brought me in.

{audio:0:04:25} How did you approach that, with Polarcus being one of the smaller seismic players in the industry?

{audio:0:04:30} To put it into perspective, for seismic acquisition, which includes those companies like ours, with vessels, there are five, roughly, six, in the market, at that time. Three to four of those companies were majors, meaning they had 12 to 16 seismic vessels and had been in business for many, many years, long-standing customers, etc. Two of those seismic companies, Polarcus being one, were new entrants, relatively small, with seven to eight vessels, so roughly half the fleet and just a fraction of years in market.

{audio:0:05:11} The challenge was to be competitive and to demonstrate our technical capabilities. I saw the real challenge as, let’s leverage what we do best, which in that case, was operational.  It doesn’t have to be everything in the geophysical space, or the geoscience space. We were competing with fully-integrated seismic companies that had research and development, manufactured equipment, acquired data like we do, sold that data like we do and then entered the data processing side of things, as well as some geophysical services on top.

{audio:0:05:50} As a new entrant, again, limited cash and a crumbling market. We couldn’t do all of that, as much as we would have liked to. So it was really to focus on the core business and what we did best, which was operations and acquiring seismic data and handing it to our clients.

{audio:0:06:11} What was the biggest challenge that you faced, being a new entrant in such a market?

{audio:0:06:18} I think, part of it, was to earn our stripes with major oil companies or the super majors. If you look at our customer list, when I joined the company, it was the independents that were looking for new technologies, in some cases, but new players, to help support competition, to help drive prices down, keep their prices at market levels and so forth. So our challenge was, how do we penetrate the major companies? We had to prove our health and safety environment record, our operations record. We were leveraging other’s technologies, which is fine, in this case. Really, how do we get that contract with a major oil company? An Exxon, a Shell, a Total, from France. That was really our challenge and what we focused, from a strategic standpoint. Let’s go prove to ourselves, to those super majors.

{audio:0:07:15} Did you approach that from the position of, we have the most efficient operational structure? How did you look to prove yourselves to those big customers?

{audio:0:07:27} It was interesting. The seismic market then and, I would argue today, was fairly commoditized. Technologies had advanced, yet it was commoditized, prices were being squeezed quite a lot, meaning acquisition contract prices. Oil companies weren’t willing to pay for the next shiny bell and whistle. They wanted their project done, hand them the data and move on. Our goal was to leverage technology, not develop new technology, but try to deploy it in a new and creative way.

{audio:0:08:07} We had some very talented geophysicists that would work, one on one, with oil companies. This is interesting, because again, from a commercial aspect, where we had to differentiate ourselves with our clients, we exploited and developed some relationships with clients where we could actually send geophysicists into the company and work with their geophysicist, to try to figure out a way to deploy existing technology, that we had access to, as well as others, in a more unique way, to reduce costs or to, effectively, create a better image, so they could explore and find oil and gas.

{audio:0:08:50} That was very effective and, again, it was working closely with clients. We had some big company clients that said, “Wow, you’re new, I’ve never met the CEO of your competitor, who we’ve worked with for years. We’d like to work with you.” Again, I think it was that openness and willingness to share our geophysical resources with those companies, to help solve a common challenge.

{audio:0:09:17} How would you describe your leadership style?

{audio:0:09:22} I would call it collaborative. I’m not a geoscientist so it’s interesting, as I’ve had a long career in the geophysical industry, so I was really forced to work with the scientists and figure out what it is that we’re selling, what we’re trying to market, what we’re trying to manage.

{audio:0:09:40} It was really a collaborative approach. I wanted open and honest managers and management team that worked with me. Tell us when we’re doing something wrong and tell us when we’re doing something right. Collaboration yet, at the same time, be able to make some tough decisions. I’m a real advocate for clarifying roles and responsibilities. It sounds a bit trite, but it’s so important that you walk in and the roles and responsibilities are clear. Then holding those people, those leaders, accountable for their roles and responsibilities. I’m a real advocate of that.

{audio:0:10:28} I’m an advocate for key performance indicators. You can’t manage what you don’t measure. Once you’ve established the roles, assigned the responsibilities and told people what they’re accountable for, you have to have a tool – the KPIs are well-known – to basically, scorecard, to display how people are doing against those. Then have open conversations about where it’s working and where it’s not, so you can adjust the goals, if it’s necessary, or adjust the performance, if that’s necessary.

{audio:0:11:03} You would set out clear KPIs and really drive accountability to those, to employees, to really measure that and to make it clear to everyone, where they stand?

{audio:0:11:15} Exactly. Obviously, you share the KPIs with the department or the function that is responsible for those. But I think it’s important, where you can, because in a public company, you have to be a bit careful about what you share with those that are not insiders, but to share those KPIs where you can and, that way, the whole organization is pulling in the same direction.

{audio:0:13:30} What do you think are the downfalls of using KPIs?

{audio:0:13:36} I think, and I’ve found myself guilty of this, where you set them out there and then everybody moves forward. So I think it’s important to revisit those KPIs, firstly, to both make sure you are measuring the right thing. Secondly, to adjust performance or adjust the business, where the KPIs might not be meeting certain objectives. I think it’s important to keep them alive and well, to talk about them, communicate about them, not only with those that are responsible, but the entire organization.

{audio:0:14:16} How do you think about setting culture, at a company like Polarcus, in an industry like oil and gas?

{audio:0:14:24} What I did at Polarcus was, I tried to bring a more open culture and bring the organization together, especially as we were entering very challenging times, as an industry. We didn’t need the separation of power, so to speak. It was really to create a more open environment, so we could hear from people in the field, in the trenches, people closest to the customers, what’s happening in the market and what’s happening with our operations, so we can manage them better.

{audio:0:15:17} I think it was really to create a more open, honest culture that everybody trusted and could believe in and were willing and comfortable in sharing their ideas, which was critical to get through the market we were facing.

{audio:0:15:34} How, exactly, did you encourage that transparency and openness?

{audio:0:15:39} It sounds a bit simple, but it was really to open communications. Again, I’m talking communications with a company that is headquartered in Dubai, operations around the world, on seven vessels that were moving all the time. You had crews you had to communicate with; you had regional offices in the usual oil and gas hotspots – Houston, London, Singapore. It was really a matter of mass communication. Myself, personally, spending a lot of time pushing the management time to spend a lot of time, in front of all the employees, all the crew roving around the world, on a few things. One, what our goals were and making them crystal clear. Updating people on how we were achieving those goals. Then also, keeping an open-door policy. It was amazing how afraid the organization was to talk to management; it just astounded me. I made a real effort to get on conference calls with the vessels, all the vessels I possibly could, wherever they might have been. Go visit our offices and really, just start creating that communication.

{audio:0:16:57} It was interesting, because the organization was fairly quiet; it was a one-way conversation I was having. It took a while to get the organization to build trust and to understand that we were, as a management team, willing to listen.

{audio:0:17:15} How did you look to codify that? Were there any tricks that you used, to really encourage that openness for people to come into your office or for people to reach out to you? Are there any tricks or tactics to drive that?

{audio:0:17:39} That’s a good question. When someone poses those questions, myself personally, and the other exec team members, to give answers, to those questions. Then people, I think, employees based around the organization, started to see that their questions were being answered. Then it became more live question and answer.

{audio:0:18:07} I think the other thing that helped open communication was being very transparent, as much as I possibly could in, what I’ll call a financial crisis for the company and for the seismic market. I even used the work bankrupt. Again, I thought my CFO was going to strangle me afterwards. But the press had been talking about it, our competitors had been talking about it. All the employees had been talking about it and questioning if it was a possibility. I couldn’t share all the details, because we’re a public company, I think it was just having that open and honest discussion, and laying out some scary words that everyone was talking about anyway.

{audio:0:19:04} I want to discuss your transition to a CEO. What was your biggest shock with the new responsibility or, as you evolved into that new leadership role?

{audio:0:19:23} I had managed pretty vast regions at my previous employer, as part of the executive team, so we had all those kind of discussions, internally and externally, with financers or shareholders, as well as the board. I think the biggest shock I had, walking into this particular organization was, I mentioned earlier, the distance between the leadership team and the rest of the organization and the distance between the leadership team and the board of directors. When I was going through the hiring process, with the committee on the board of directors, they shared with me the upcoming year’s budget; they had redacted certain things, from a competitive standpoint. But enough to give me an idea of where the company was.

{audio:0:20:30} At the first board meeting, shortly thereafter, the board was aghast, I was aghast, at how the numbers had changed, presented from the management team, to the board, from just two months ago. Granted, the market was changing but certainly not that much as to where the budget differences from where we were, earlier on. I guess, the lack of transparency between the leadership team and the board of directors was surprise. Something that didn’t happen again, but I think was very important for any organization.

{audio:0:21:17} How did you approach building and structuring a team around you, as CEO?

{audio:0:21:24} Coming in, the board had recognized there were some need for new management, on the leadership team. I got myself familiar with the organization, to see where there might be holes, if there were any; where there might be strengths, if there were any. I took that time to assess the organization and figure out what we needed as a management team. Then looked for individuals to fill the gaps.

{audio:0:22:10} We had some very talented people, within the organization. So we brought them up to the executive team, in some cases. We brought some in from the outside. The intent was to build that transparency, not only as part of the executive team, but the rest of the organization, as well. Those were the attributes that I was looking for, when I reshaped the management team.

{audio:0:22:42} The interesting thing I will share with you, and I was surprised when I walked in. I asked, who was on the executive team and I got two answers; 10 people or 12 people. I said, this can’t be. You must know if you are on the exec team or not on the exec team. But it’s that role and responsibility definition that is so critical. Again, we were purposed, when I walked in, to be a much larger company and grow, grow, grow. We took that exec team, which was 10 to 12, shrunk it down to five of us, to really focus on what we needed; more fit for purpose, with a few different players to build that culture and lead change, through the company.

{audio:0:23:29} How did you look at choosing characters, to fit around your expertise?

{audio:0:23:36} I looked for those individuals that were open to change and, as I mentioned, some of those were actually in the organization, pushing for, crying out for, change, when I had walked in. And probably had been, prior to that. Then I looked at the outside, those individuals that were – I can’t say change agents – but that had experience in going through change, in their particular roles. Again, openness, willingness to roll up their sleeves.

{audio:0:27:06} Rod, let’s take a step back to that restructuring and that bankruptcy word that you were transparent about. Can you just set a bit of context to the oil price decline and the environment you were in, in 2015, 2016?

{audio:0:27:22} If you look back, the oil price in, let’s say, July 2014, was roughly $112 a barrel. If you look at December 2014, it was down to $55 a barrel. So less than half. It bounced around the 50 mark, during 2015, 2016. In 2014, you had a lot of vessels that had entered the market in the previous two years. You had oversupply of seismic vessel capacity, layered on top of oil price that had been cut in half and exploration budgets that had been reduced by 60% to 65%, so there was massively reduced demand for seismic spend.

{audio:0:28:50} Typically, in 2014, on average, seismic spend was about an $8 billion market, and that had reduced to about $3 billion, in 2015, 2016. So less than half, with an oversupply of capacity. That’s the market we were faced with, at that time. Everybody reacted way too late, especially when you had vessels you had to keep busy. The day rates that we were charging had plummeted. The interesting thing around Polarcus’s business model is, we were the low-cost, still are the low-cost operator. That was based on several factors but, again, focused on the acquisition space of that business. Most efficient, newer vessels and so forth. We were able to operate at break even, at much lower day rates than anybody else in the business. We had to get very competitive on pricing, with our customer base, to keep our vessels busy, which was the name of the game.

{audio:0:30:06} Clearly, you were the lowest unit cost supplier, I guess? Your profitability was the highest, at that low price. How did you enforce encouragement or motivation on your employees, at such an uncertain and fragile time, in the industry?

{audio:0:30:46} It was an interesting turn of events and, again, I think employees were looking for any information and we tried to convey what our plans were, in the market. What we had working in our favor, as well, is that there weren’t a lot of companies that were hiring seismic specialists, at that time. At the same time, it goes back to communication to our employees as to where we were, from a financial standpoint; what we were doing. Again, I couldn’t share it all, because we are a public company. But as soon as we could share something, we would share it with the employees and tell them where we were on the KPIs and the data, so they could see where we were and what changes we had made.

{audio:0:31:49} The other thing I had done, when I walked in, and it goes back to getting the organization moving towards one path, I set forth something very simple and we really marketed it internally, which was the 2015 Agenda. It was nothing other than, our agenda for 2015 forward was, revenue enhancement, cost savings and balance sheet management. Those three things, we tried to gear every discussion around, whether it was us, as the leadership team, with the board and with the employees. We made a bit of a joke about it, but in any conversation where we got off track, and if it wasn’t around revenue generation, cash savings or balance sheet management, we weren’t going to have that conversation.

{audio:0:32:49} It’s amazing how the organization took to that. These quarterly employee meetings, our board meetings, our letter to the board of directors, were all geared towards that. And certainly, towards our financial investors, where we obviously had a lot of discussion with our banks, on that balance sheet management.

{audio:0:33:24} We explained, this is what we’re doing for revenue management. Our total revenues might not have gone up, but compared to where we were in the marketplace, we had the best vessel utilization and the most revenues that were available in that market were coming our way from the market share.

{audio:0:33:42} What were the major hard decisions you had to make, during that restructuring period?

{audio:0:33:49} That part of it was, limiting our growth opportunities. I like to make things grow; I like to expand the business. But it was really the opposite; let’s contract and focus on what we do best, which is operating seismic vessels, acquiring data. A lot of other elements to the geophysical space, to the seismic space, that we could expand to, and the company had plans to, but cutting those back was probably the most difficult thing to do. But it was what we had to do, to survive, to preserve cash. That meant, in some cases, laying off employees.

{audio:0:34:27} For example, in the seismic industry, when you cold stack a vessel, it means taking the vessel out of the market, tying it up, laying off the crew – three crews that you have to lay off – so roughly 100 people, just for one vessel. Knowing you’re probably not going to bring that vessel back anytime soon, if ever. Those kind of tough decisions that were probably long overdue, given the market we were facing, I walked into and had to make them relatively quickly, once you understood where the company was.

{audio:0:35:03} How did you approach those difficult conversations, in letting people go?

{audio:0:35:10} It wasn’t that easy. But I orchestrated, in that we had communicated where we were, as a company. The market was helping us by saying, look, these seismic companies are in trouble. We had all that, helping to ease the pain. But at the same time, it was painful. We just had open discussions, for those that were being laid off because a vessel was being tied up. Some discussions were around logical business decisions. Others were around performance. Those were a bit more difficult but, again, having established clear roles and clear responsibilities and signing up, in some instances, with the scorecards, you could look back and point to, this is what didn’t happen that should have happened and this is why you’re no longer with the company.

{audio:0:36:11} Try to use all that information as a basis for communication, to help guide you, going forward.

{audio:0:36:22} Can you remember any, typically, very difficult discussions you had, with letting employees go? How did you navigate those?

{audio:0:36:31} I empathized with them and tried to make it very matter of fact, sticking to the facts, sticking to performance issues, sticking to discussions we’d had, about those performance issues. Again, with or without a scorecard. You have to show emotion, but at the same time, you have to be able to understand why you’ve made that decision and talk the person through it.

{audio:0:37:06} What about discussions with lenders or shareholders, in these tough periods?

{audio:0:37:16} Those are very difficult. Again, I’ll go back to the fact that we had taken several measures to refocus the company, cut costs. We could demonstrate where we had done that. All the things we had done, as management, to try to control costs, save on air travel, all the things you would normally do. We demonstrated that to our investors and lenders. Then we also demonstrated to them, the things we had done to get back to the agenda, the revenue generation side of it and the things we had done to capture new market share, in a very difficult market. The things we had done from technology application and so forth. Those types of things went very far in helping gain support.

{audio:0:38:24} If you have those kind of things, to demonstrate to your lenders and your investors, they’re willing to lend and invest again. So I think you have to have a legitimate story to go back in and say, look, we need more money or please invest again, when we issue new equity. You have to have all that packaged up and, having done your homework, and have it put in place, to demonstrate you are still a good investment.

{audio:0:38:55} How did you keep your head, amongst the crazy oil price, the change in share price and high debt levels? How did you react to that, personally?

{audio:0:39:09} It was a lot of hours and, again, we were a global company, based in the Middle East. We had no real customers or offices in the Middle East, other than our headquarters. It was a lot of travel, not only with our customers and employees but as you said, our investors. We had to communicate with everyone. But quite frankly, I talked about that 2015 Agenda that we put together. I really started putting that together for myself. Where am I going to focus my time and energy, because I wanted to do it all; I wanted to impress all and be king of the world. But I actually put that 2015 Agenda together for myself, to say, look, this is where I have to focus my time. Then it dawned on me, well jeez, I need to get those followers to focus their time on that, otherwise they’ll take me in different directions, or the rest of the organization in different directions.

{audio:0:40:08} I think it’s finding, whatever that agenda mantra might be, but I think it’s finding something to focus on, to save your business and that will get you through it.

{audio:0:40:33} How did you approach that 2015 Agenda?

{audio:0:40:41} It made sense to look at what we had to focus on and what I had to focus on. Then it really dawned on me that we had to market this, internally, as much as we possibly could. We put posters up. We started every employee meeting with, what’s the 2015 Agenda? Everything dovetailed into one of those three categories. Then we decided to let’s take that to our customers, because we were getting beaten up in the marketplace, not only by our competitors. “They’re going to go bankrupt; work with us.” The press was picking up on that. So we had to go out and talk to all of our customers. The COO and I went around the world, talked to our top 30 customers and they were very appreciative that one of their big suppliers was in talking to them, trying to clarify, which made their job easier to award us work, or consider awarding us work. They were very appreciative of us being open and honest.

{audio:0:42:12} One of them said to us, I have to commend you; I’m very appreciative. I had worked with your biggest competitor, for many years but I couldn’t even tell you the name of the CEO. Just that type of connection and openness, as I will call it, was crucial to keeping our customers with us. Then we applied the same thing with our lenders and investors. We showed them the 2015 Agenda; showed them some accomplishments, towards that agenda. We marketed the hell out of it, internally and externally.

{audio:0:42:53} How did you hone your focus then, in this period? You’ve got very high debts, lowest oil price you’ve seen in decades and all the E&P companies pulling back their spend. Where was your focus, specifically, in terms of coming up with that agenda?

{audio:0:43:12} It was pretty clear to me, certainly the first two, revenue generation and cost control. The cost control was, get the management team together and let’s look at all discretionary costs. I have to say, it was very obvious to me and, again, I’m the outsider coming in, but you would have thought that you were cutting people’s arms off on some of the costs we were trying to mitigate. It was like, you guys, don’t you understand, we’re going to be bankrupt if we don’t do something and cut these costs, hone down the organization as far as all the things we’re working on; focus back to the core business.

{audio:0:43:52} On the revenue side, in my view, the company was a little bit late in identifying the market was crumbling around them. I attributed that to the fact that we had a very centralized sales organization. So in our three regional offices – Houston, London, Singapore – we had one or two people, just as local representatives.  Then the bulk of our sales group was sitting in Dubai. We had no customers in Dubai; they’re all your typical oil companies, scattered around the world. So our sales people were on airplanes, most of the time and so they were very far removed from the market. We were not very well in touch with what our customers were willing to pay, what the competitors were getting away with. We had no contracts, or no backlog, as we call it, when I walked in that door, for the next two or three quarters.

{audio:0:44:55} We had to change that. So we took our very talented sales force, with the exception of one, to coordinate some things, and we moved them all to our three existing regional offices, to be there, with the customer, closer to the market, understanding the market. They could communicate that back to Dubai, if necessary. So that was huge. A while later, we were able to demonstrate that we were gaining market share and controlling costs and we had a chance to survive this and come out better on the other end. They were very difficult negotiations, I might add, but they were willing to work with us, to refinance.

{audio:0:46:07} How did you take responsibility of that restructuring situation?

{audio:0:46:16} I went to all the meetings with our banks and I thinks that the banks saw that change in leadership and that I was willing to attend all the meetings and attend all the negotiations. I went with our CFO, to all of those. It took some time, but I thought it was important to establish, we’ve got a new management team who have invested in making this work. We’ve got a new approach on how we’re going to tackle the market and so forth. The banks, in this case, really wanted to hear from us. Then we did a lot of investor conferences. Again, very difficult times; you normally wouldn’t do that. We went to all the usual investor conferences, financial centers, to make our pitch, in a very difficult market, promoting the 2015 Agenda.

{audio:0:47:16} How did you structure negotiations with the banks, in these times?

{audio:0:47:26} That, I would say, was very, very difficult. I think what was amazing to me is the restrictions they had. You could be working with the president of a particular bank and his or her hands were tied in cases. They had their fiduciary committees, their boards of directors, that they had to get things approved by. So we had some things agreed to that they came back and said, we can’t agree to this anymore; we have to go back and renegotiate. That was very frustrating, but I think, being able to sell our story, meaning the 2015 Agenda, was absolutely critical in making that happen. We actually got new investors in, from an equity standpoint, during those discussions.

{audio:0:48:19} Just back to the point on your sales team not being close enough to the markets, what was the mistake there, in organizational structure, from Polarcus’s point of view?

{audio:0:48:38} I think it was a mindset of having things very centralized. From an operations standpoint, you’ve got to standardize and have a certain perspective on issues of marine business and the seismic business. I think, certain things, you do want to centralize. But I think they took that concept – and, again, the company was started with an operational mindset – we need to get this thing up and running very quickly; let’s centralize everything. Unfortunately, the sales team came with that mentality and it was stuck there. I think, from a commercial standpoint, it appeared that they didn’t realize that they were out of touch with customers.

{audio:0:49:45} What were the main lessons, for you, from that tough period of restructuring?

{audio:0:49:53} It reinforced the fact that you have to communicate more and more than you absolutely think you have to. The lesson I did learn, as much as I talked about communication, I had a lot of communications with our board of directors, as you can imagine. I think in one year, in 2015, maybe 2016, probably both, we had over 44 board meetings or board calls. We were communicating all the time.

{audio:0:50:26} I think what I would do differently next time, is I would take more time, personally, to go to talk to the individual board members, to better understand their particular needs, versus the collective board of directors. We missed the mark, went out to get new financing, the management team wasn’t in agreement with the board on how much to go and raise. I think I would have done a little more work with individual board members, one on one.

{audio:0:50:58} Did you face any specific challenges engaging or communicating with the board itself?

{audio:0:51:04} No, no. As I mentioned, we would have a lot of board meetings, a lot of board calls, fairly dire calls, in some cases. Very interactive, when it came to meeting with the board, as a group. I just think some of the nuances that I missed or the board missed, individually, was that one on one. What do you really think, versus the collective board? I probably should share, the original founder had majority control in the company, so the founders had a lot of influence on the board, although they only had one vote on the board. But there was a lot of influence, because they were the original investors and had a lot at risk. I think having the individual discussions, more one on one contact with the board, probably could have helped navigate things a bit better.

{audio:0:52:10} Is there anything else that you would have done differently, during this restructuring period, in 2015, 2016?

{audio:0:52:42} Maybe a bit before that, then? You mentioned a couple of things that you missed, such as the sales team being too centralized, maybe this mindset on the culture of Polarcus, before you joined. You mentioned being a bit slow to adapt to the changes, because of that. Is there anything else that you could have changed beforehand or really lessons that you’ve learned from that?

{audio:0:53:12} I mentioned earlier that I made some personnel decisions on the leadership team, after a little less than a year on the job. I probably would have made some of those decisions a bit sooner. Looking back, just now necessary it was to make cultural changes in the organization. At the end of the day, those changes were the ones that everybody expected would be changed, anyway, from a personnel standpoint. I think I probably would have moved on those a bit sooner than I did.

{audio:0:54:12} The last question then, looking back on that whole period, in terms of the restructuring, the business coming out of it, what are the key lessons that you’d like to share with young leaders, in navigating really tricky times?

{audio:0:54:34} I think, get engaged, delegate, for sure. Make sure you delegate; you can’t do everything yourself. Make sure you’re engaged. Make sure you’re close to the organization. I don’t mean just your management team; of course, you have to be. You have to have trust and open communication, certainly between that level. But make sure you’re closer to the entire organization. It doesn’t mean you have to do their jobs, but it means you have to understand the temperature. I think it’s taking the time, the extra effort to get out there and actually talk to everybody in the organization. If it’s the mechanic in the machine room or your receptionist, to your top sales person, to your CFO. You have to make sure you take the time to communicate.

{audio:0:56:05} Rod, this was great. Thanks for your time.

Polarcus: Seismic Acquisition Restructuring

Challenges for Polarcus competing with larger seismic acquisition companies

Polarcus' 2015 Agenda to restructure the business and reduce operating costs

The importance of communicating clearly internally and externally

Polarcus: Seismic Acquisition Restructuring

Former CEO at Polarcus

inpractise.com/articles/polarcus-seismic-acquisition

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Rod Starr

Former CEO at Polarcus

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Polarcus: Seismic Acquisition Restructuring(March 19, 2020)

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