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Anonymous

Former Global Head of Pricing and Strategic Initiatives at Uber 

Founders: Choosing the Right Investors

{audio:0:00:02} I think a good place to start would be if we could take a step back to when you joined Uber. How were you thinking about pricing for the ride-hailing business?

{audio:0:00:17} I joined Uber in 2015, when it was expanding, very rapidly, in some of the emerging markets, like the Asian and the developing markets. At the time, they were also developing new products, like Uber Eats and Uber Pool. Our top process for Uber’s pricing, especially for ride-sharing, was that there were a few areas we wanted to focus on.

{audio:0:00:42} First, we wanted to be the cheapest ride-sharing player in the market and that would mean two things. Firstly, we would like to be at least 35% to 40% cheaper than a taxi. The way we thought about this product was, we are not only competing with the taxi, as a product, but we also wanted to compete with public transportation or personal vehicle ownership. If you keep the price of your product, 35% to 40% cheaper than a taxi you could, potentially, compete with public transportation and, also, personal vehicle ownership. That was one thought process that was in our minds, when we were going to a particular market.

{audio:0:01:21} We also wanted to make sure that we have back-calculated pricing in such a way that drivers are making enough money, in that particular market. The way we thought about what was enough money, was to look into what were the other top employers in that market. For example, if you think about the US market, you will have Walmart or Starbucks, who are the largest employers. Let’s say, they are paying $15 to $16 per hour, we would like to make sure that, in the long term, on the platform, if the drivers achieve X percentage of efficiency, they are able to make that amount of money, or more than that.

{audio:0:02:09} The way we think about efficiency is, the amount of the time that the drivers have the app switched on, that would be your numerator. The denominator would be, for how much time they are on a trip. For each city, we will think what your long-term efficiency, for that market, would look like and, for that efficiency level, we’ll set pricing in such a way that Uber’s drivers are able to make enough money. By taking those two factors into account, one, on the rider side, we want to make sure that the product is 35% to 40% cheaper and, on the driver side, that they are able to make enough money, at a certain efficiency level.

{audio:0:02:54} To reach that particular efficiency level, it may take a certain amount of time; it may take six to nine months. Whilst you are working to reach that efficiency level, you want to provide a driver subsidy and a rider subsidy. The rider subsidy is used to make sure that you have the network effect kick in. The driver subsidy is because, during that time that they are reaching that efficiency, they still need to make enough money in the market. That’s how, on the overall picture, we think about the pricing.

{audio:0:03:30} Driver’s earnings are actually a core focus? You would back-out the utilization from that $15 an hour, for example, that you want the driver to earn?

{audio:0:03:40} Yes. We had a lot of data, from launching in many cities, so we knew what the potential efficiency would look like, in a particular city. We had the characteristics of different cities. For example, San Francisco, LA, New York, they can combine into a particular group of cities and we can assume that, yes, those cities could reach 60% to 70% efficiency, whilst the other set of cities, like Dallas, Houston, etc., they could, potentially, be 50% to 60% efficiency. When we are launching in a new market, we could say that, okay, this market could resemble this city and what the long-term efficiency for that particular market would be.

{audio:0:04:23} If we achieve that efficiency, in the six to nine months, what should the driver pricing be so at that efficiency level, the driver can still make sufficient money, in that market.

{audio:0:04:35} This is why scale is so important, because the more drivers you have, the more riders, the higher the frequency, the lower the cost. This makes it cheaper for the rider and more rides, means more earnings for drivers?

{audio:0:04:53} Yes, that’s correct. The cheaper the product, more people will use it. As you have more and more people using it, that specifically means that the driver opportunity will go up. Let’s say there are more and more people using it, there will be one ride after another, so there won’t be any wait time for the drivers. As their efficiency increases, they will be able to make a similar amount of money, even at the lower prices for the riders.

{audio:0:05:18} For example, let’s say we started at a $10 ride, for the rider. At that time, the efficiency, because of the level of demand, was 40%. If you cut the pricing to $5, in that particular market, the demand will go up, exponentially. What would that mean? The driver’s efficiency could increase from 40% to 60% or 70% and they can still make the same amount of money, as they were doing when the prices were $10 for the rider.

{audio:0:05:51} Although, in some of the markets, if you don’t see that a certain level of efficiency kicks in, or a certain amount of ride volume go up, as we cut the prices, we are open to roll-back those price cuts that we used to do.

{audio:0:06:05} What examples do you have of where that didn’t work?

{audio:0:06:10} For example, we did do this price cut, at the time, in hundreds of cities in the US and other parts of the world. Out of all those cities, we’ll track the specific metrics and the driver earning and efficiency levels were two of the metrics.  We tracked those metrics, to enable us to understand the health of those markets, whether there was enough of a balance between the supply and demand, after the price cut in that market.

{audio:0:06:43} Two things could happen after the price cut. Either your demand goes up, significantly and that means that the driver’s efficiency goes up and drivers are making enough money, even at the lower prices for the rider. The second situation could be, you cut the prices but demand does not go up, significantly. Because of that, drivers are not making enough money and drivers churn on the platform and then you will see higher surge and smaller number of drivers to receive, and higher ETAs. If you see those types of metrics, then you must be open to consider rolling back the price cut, so that the drivers can make the same amount of money that they were making earlier.

{audio:0:07:35} How do you balance that supply and demand? Is efficiency the key metric here that you need to focus on, in all cities?

{audio:0:07:45} Not really. Efficiency is, definitely, one of the metrics that we consider. But there are a set of several metrics that are very important for us to look at, to understand the supply and demand of that market. We’re looking at both supply-side metrics and demand-side metrics. On the demand side, we’re looking at surge, so how many trips are surging, as compared to requested trips. How many people are requesting and, out of those requests, how many trips are being completed. Those are mainly surge and complete to receive, on the demand side.

{audio:0:08:28} On the supply side, efficiency is definitely one of the metrics. ETAs, estimated time of arrival, was another metric. Those were a key set of four metrics that we will look at, in any of the markets, to understand whether it is a supply-constrained market or a demand-constrained market. For example, within a particular city, they have higher surge, lower C2R. Higher surge will indicate, yes, it’s a supply-constrained market, so that’s why you have a lot more demand and lower supply. If there is a higher C2R, it means that a lot of trips are being completed, which would mean that it is a demand-constrained market. Lower efficiency will indicate, if it’s a demand-constrained market, you can, potentially, increase the demand to increase the efficiency levels, or it’s an over-supplied market. The fourth one, as we talked about, if there are higher ETAs, it would mean that there is not enough supply. If there are lower ETAs, you have a lot of supply.

{audio:0:09:44} Based on those, we’ll think about what is the best action to take, for that particular market. We look at those four different metrics and, depending on higher or lower, for each of those metrics, we can come up with different strategies for that specific market.

{audio:0:10:02} Thinking specifically for the take rate for Uber, and you can see, from the recent reports from Uber, the ride-hailing business is evolving pretty well and growing quickly. I think they predict that their take rates will be growing. How do you look at that evolution of take rate, as the business scales?

{audio:0:10:22} There are a couple of factors. Part of it is the way that P&L is represented and it’s related to accounting, as well. The way that P&L is structured is a net take rate. A net take rate is a combination of three different things. One is, your pure take rate, that you charge the drivers. There are also a couple of contra-revenue items. One is the driver incentives and then the rider-side promotions. While your take rate could still be constant, because of the variation in ride-side promotions and driver incentives, your net take rate could still fluctuate.

{audio:0:11:03} The way I think about it is, what will happen in the longer term? Why is the take rate for Uber 25%, in most of the market? The take rate could also vary from market to market and from product to product. Let’s say, the standard product, UberX, has a take rate of 25%, but other products will have different take rates. In the US, the take rate is 25%, but in some other markets, because of the competition or the regulatory issues, the take rate could be different.  If the take rate is 25%, in a market like the US, your net take rate is reduced, because you are offering some of the incentives and rider-side promotions. For example, earlier in the evolution, the promotions were around 3% to 5% and incentives were 3% to 5%. So your take rate was reduced from 25%, all the way to 15%.

{audio:0:11:57} As your other items are reducing, your take rate is growing closer to 25%. That would be one of the biggest factors to drive the take rate upwards. I believe that it will be very hard to move your real take rate that you are charging to the drivers, up from 25%, to a different level. Ultimately, if it’s a more supply-constrained market, demand is huge but if you have a very difficult source of supply, it will continue to remain a supply-constrained market and you need to keep your take rate where it is right now, rather than moving it up. You can still continue to optimize your promotions and incentives, but the real take rate, it’s very hard to move it upwards from here.

{audio:0:12:46} That’s where, again, scale matters. If you own the market, your drivers are stickier, therefore you can reduce the promotions and incentives on that, to increase your net take rate?

{audio:0:12:59} Yes; scale definitely matters a lot, from various perspectives. One, to provide the right experience to your riders, so that have the right ETAs, enough supply, etc. On the driver’s side, to ensure that they have options. Once you have a bit more scale, I think it’s pretty evident, throughout the industry, that the more scale you have, the more pricing power you will have. If you have more pricing power, you can then definitely optimize your promotions and incentives, to increase profitability.

{audio:0:13:36} Could we look, more fundamentally, at pricing and take rates? There are many different marketplaces and platforms, online digital marketplaces, today. You mentioned supply-focused and demand-focused platforms. Whether it’s Poshmark or the traditional platforms like eBay, how do you look at take rate and pricing on marketplaces, more broadly?

{audio:0:14:05} There are a few ways to triangulate the take rate. One, obviously, in any of the marketplaces, you look at the competitors and what kind of take rates they are providing. Their perceived take rate could be very different from their real take rate. To give you an example of a player in the European market, Vinted. What they do is, their take rate on the supply side, is zero. They don’t charge anything on the supply side. But they have bits and pieces of charging, to different players. They charge a take rate to a buyer. They also charge, potentially, a credit card fee on the transaction. Additionally, they also have promoted listings. That’s their way to make their unit economics work.

{audio:0:14:59} The second example would be Etsy. They only charge 5% to their sellers, but they also have the promoted listings. They are making a lot of revenue through those advertisements. Ultimately, for any of the players, the way that they think about the take rate is three different areas. One is whether it is a supply-constrained market or a demand-constrained market. What does the competition really look like and how your unit economics or business model will work? For any business model to work, the difference between contribution and profit needs to be positive. The way they think about it is, what should our gross margins look like and what the margins should look like, in the longer term.

{audio:0:15:48} The biggest cost item, in these marketplaces, are shipping, credit card hosting, etc. You need a certain take rate, to cover your cost items and, after that, you have to invest a lot in the marketing. Yes, different companies have different business models and different ways of structuring their take rate. They can generate their revenue in three ways, by charging the supply side, by charging the demand side or by having some other source of revenue, such as advertising. The different players have different ways of thinking about it. Poshmark want to keep it as simple as possible, so they charge 20% to the sellers. After that, they do not charge anything to the buyer; they do not have any advertising revenue. Those are the factors that we take into account, when thinking about the take rate.

{audio:0:16:38} One think I would say is, whatever business model works, it’s better to have the take rate, at that particular level, as soon as possible. It’s very hard to move the take rate up from X percent, to X plus Y percent, in the future. For example, there is a player in the US called Threadup. They started with a low take rate, of 10%, but then they realized that it’s very hard for their unit economics to work and they had to move their take rate from 10% to 15% first and then from 15% to 20%. They saw a lot of concern from the sellers, because they were used to a 10% take rate. Similarly, in the case of Uber, a long time back, we had a take rate of 20%. After that, we were planning to move the take rate from 20% to 25% and we saw a lot of friction, although we had to do that, to make our business model work.

{audio:0:17:37} So I think the right way to think about it is, yes, you can have lower take rates but, ultimately, if you want to a path to profitability, you need to think about the costs and the structure for your business and what data will be required for your business model to work.

{audio:0:17:53} What are the other mistakes that businesses typically make, in pricing and, specifically around the take rate?

{audio:0:18:03} There are a few things. One, on the pricing side, I would say that a lot of companies are not open to self-cannibalize. That was the strategy that Uber followed; they were much more comfortable self-cannibalizing their own revenue, for the long-term success of the business. It is very hard to cut your price, if your business is already growing very fast, at a certain price point. It’s very hard and requires a long-term vision, for you to cut the prices to this particular level, so that you can grow and create your network effect much faster. I would say, a lot of times, the complacency is one of the biggest mistakes that many of the businesses make. If they are successful at a certain price, they aren’t able to envisage what the success would look like at a different price point. That was one mistake.

{audio:0:19:00} The second thing is, being very open to experimentation at a different price point. It’s very hard to understand the consumer behavior or the price elasticity, until you have experimented in many different cities, with different customer behavior. So being a bit more open and being very quick to do those pricing experiments is very important.

{audio:0:19:25} On the take rate side, there is very good article from Bill Gurley, about what could make a very high take rate. The issue with take rate is, you need to balance between the right take rate. If you have it very low, it will be very hard for your business model to work and you will have a lot of losses and it’s very hard to move up. If you have a very high take rate, there will be a lot of friction in your marketplace, because it’s a very competitive field. If your take rate is high, obviously, the consumers can go to a different marketplace. Having that right balance between a take rate that is neither too high or too low, is very important. Also, being a bit more thoughtful about what you want to do. Do you want to charge the supply side or the buyer side, depending on where the frictions are, in the marketplace? For example, in our case, we rely on the fact that we are providing a lot of value to the sellers. It’s a very new platform, where we made it very easy for the sellers to sell their products and we are generating a lot of demand for them. So for us, it seems as if the 20% take rate is a good position for us, as opposed to having a 10% to 15% take rate as we are, ultimately, at the service of our sellers. If you are providing a lot of value, and lots of services for our sellers, a 20% take rate seems pretty reasonable.

{audio:0:20:59} Similarly, for Uber, a 25% take rate was required, because there was a lot of investment in R&D, technology and operations, which was required to support the marketplace they were creating.

{audio:0:21:15} Especially in Europe, you have seen some competitors enter the ride business and have a lower take rate and try and, supposedly, give value back to the drivers. What is your view on how Uber could react to those lower take rate competitors?

{audio:0:21:35} The good thing about Uber is that they have very deep pockets now. They are a public company; they have $11 billion in cash. In any of those markets, if a competitor comes, they have a deep pocket, to compete with those players. For example, let’s say that a player comes along with 10% take rate and Uber’s take rate is 20%. Firstly, because efficiency on Uber’s platform is around 60% to 70%, the other player, if they are charging 10% take rate, but their efficiency is only 30%, then the drivers will be making the same amount of money on Uber’s platform, as compared to the competitor’s platform.

{audio:0:22:23} The other platform, therefore, needs to invest a lot of money to generate the rider-side demand and, unless they have very deep pockets, they will have a tough time to sustain that for a long period of time. But what Uber can do, in this particular case, is if the take rate on the other platform is 10% as opposed to Uber’s of 20%, rather than changing the fundamental structure of the take rate, they can provide a short-term subsidy to the drivers and also short-term promotions to the riders. The battle, between those two players, will continue for a while, until the time that the other players realize that it’s very hard for them to continue to burn the money, against a player who has deep pockets and who has high market share and high efficiency and better technology and infrastructure, to provide a better product and a better service.

{audio:0:23:12} So, I think, in Uber’s case, the right strategy would be to continue to execute on your longer-term vision, with a great service, a great product. In the short term, you might have to provide some more incentives and promotions, to compete with the players, so that you can still continue to work towards a certain market share, in that market.

{audio:0:23:38} This is where scale actually provides a real competitive advantage for Uber?

{audio:0:23:42} Yes, that is correct. I think that is why the market, where, for example, in London or France, or some of the Latin American markets and some of the cities in the US and, let’s say, Didi in China or Grab in South East Asia, if they have certain scale and have a certain market share, it’s very hard to displace that. However, in the US, because, in certain cities, Lyft also has the equivalent market share, that’s why there are a lot more promotions and subsidies for Uber in US marketplaces, which are a bit more competitive. Lyft is also a public company and they also have access to capital.

{audio:0:24:31} But yes, if you are in a market where you have achieved scale, where you have significant market share and you have deep pockets, it’s very hard for a competitive player to come and compete with you.

{audio:0:24:44} How would you price the ride-hailing business for Lyft?

{audio:0:24:54} I think that’s a tough question because, ultimately, if Uber already has a 70% to 80% market share, in that case, they have a better product, better scale and it’s very tough to compete with them. The only thing that could work, in Lyft’s favor, is focus and continuing to do product innovation and product development. Uber is definitely focused on multiple areas. For example, ride sharing, Uber Eats, AT&T, etc. The focus on innovation is practiced across multiple areas. One thing that Lyft could do is spend a bit more on the product innovation side. I don’t think that they can do much on the pricing side. Whatever they do on the pricing side, Uber can continue to do a similar thing themselves. The good thing is, both of them are public companies in the US market and both of them need to show a path to profitability to their investors. That’s why there is a bit more sensibility in the market.

{audio:0:26:11} My response would be that it would be very hard for Lyft to do anything on the pricing side. The two things that they can do is, they can do more product innovation and a bit more investment in the loyalty programs or some of the Amazon Prime type of products. It’s more the innovation and being quick to the market. Because of their focus, specifically on the US ride-sharing market, those should be their focus areas. Other than that, it will be very hard for Lyft to continue to price it very differently from Uber.

{audio:0:26:49} What is your view on the classification of drivers? Are they employees or are they contractors?

{audio:0:27:00} If you ask drivers what they like about this platform, is the freedom. They have, firstly, the choice, in terms of where they can drive, how much they can drive, when they can drive. It has provided a lot of benefits, to a lot of people who can’t find work at Walmart or Starbucks, such as a working mom, retired people. A large number of different groups of people have been provided with new opportunities and new freedom. Also, it provided a new platform for earning. From my perspective, Uber’s platform provides a lot of benefits and value to these drivers, in many different ways. Drivers do not care whether they are classified as an employee or a contractor, all the time they are getting this freedom and this earning ability.

{audio:0:28:00} From Uber’s perspective, yes, obviously, it provides an additional cost and additional friction, on the platform. My take is that it’s more of a regulatory and compliance battle, which continues to exist in the markets. In general, I would say that everyone, including consumers, will be better off, if the people continue to be classified as a contractor. It remains to be seen what will happen in the future. For example, if you think about those drivers, they did not have any of the insurance, etc. before they were driving on Uber’s platform. When they join the Uber platform, it provides them earning ability, it provides them with flexibility. If you create much more friction on the platform, it will bring down the innovation and the liquidity on the system and that could hurt, potentially, the drivers, in the long term.

{audio:0:29:00} Do you think it would break the unit economics, if they had to pay drivers, as employees, fixed salaries, plus benefits?

{audio:0:29:11} Yes, it will change the unit economics but, ultimately, their thought process will be to pass on those costs, back to the riders. That may, potentially, slow down the growth, but it will be very hard for Uber to take a hit on the unit economics because of this. It has happened in a lot of cities. For example, New York and a lot of other cities have introduced a tax. In general, the ride-sharing platform will have to pass on those taxes to the riders. That’s how, eventually, you create a friction on the platform. If you have liquidity problems, the drivers will suffer, ultimately, as well.

{audio:0:29:56} Moving onto Uber Eats and the food delivery business, how is the price setting different for the Eats business, versus the ride business, at Uber?

{audio:0:30:07} The Eats business is very different from the ride-sharing business, in certain ways. One is, it’s a three-player marketplace, rather than a two-player marketplace. Because of that, it becomes a little more complex. The good thing about the Eats business was, there are already some publicly-listed comparables available. For example, Grubhub in the US and some of the marketplaces in the UK, as well. If Grubhub’s take rate was 15% for the marketplace product and a lot of other players, for example DoorDash, which also used to exist, before Uber Eats locked on, their take rate was 25% to 30% on the restaurant side.

{audio:0:30:51} The take rate, on the restaurant side, was a bit higher than the ride-sharing’s pure take rate on the driver’s side, for two reasons. Firstly, because this platform is a bit more expensive because you have to pay drivers money and, on the restaurant side, their gross margins are around 60% to 70%. So there is pressure to pay 25% to 30% take rate to these players. The take rate on the restaurant side was a little bit more of an easier task because most of the restaurants would charge 25% to 30% take rate. If it was a large strategic partner, you could negotiate those deals. But, in general, the take rate on the restaurant side is 25% to 30%.

{audio:0:31:32} Then there are a few other criteria that need to be taken into account on the platforms. How much you need to pay to the drivers? You need to pay the drivers at a similar rate, so they are making the same amount of money as on the X platform, otherwise it will be very hard for them to move from X platform to Eats platform. One interesting thing about the ride-sharing and Eats platform, is that they are complementary to each other, from the supply side. Why is this? The ride-sharing platform has a lot more demand, during the commuter hours of the morning and the early evening. The Eats platform has more demand over the lunch and dinner periods. Because of that, you have the advantage that the same supply could be used on the different platforms, but you still want to make sure that the drivers are making enough money on both platforms. That’s how you think about how much you need to pay to the driver.

{audio:0:32:35} How much you will charge the eater is usually between $2 and $5 and you continue to experiment with that behavior. Also, you could introduce surge on that side of pricing. Those are the three different components – the take rate will be 25% to 30% on the restaurant side; the drivers will be paid similar to what they are earning on the ride-sharing platform; then you charge the eater somewhere between $2 and $5.

{audio:0:33:13} There are a couple of things that will finally determine the profitability of this platform. Not only those three dynamics but, also, how frequently eaters are paying a tip on the platform. You don’t take that into account, directly, but it will still dictate the choice of the driver to drive on the ride-sharing platform or the Eats platform. The second thing is, how many trips you are able to complete within an hour. The more trips that a driver can complete in an hour, Uber could, potentially, pay less per trip and, even though they pay less per trip, the drivers can make enough money on the platform.

{audio:0:34:01} So you look at the break-even trips per hour, for the driver to earn a certain rate. As you do get density and scale, that price per trip, will decrease and, therefore, Uber’s margins will increase?

{audio:0:34:15} Yes. That is exactly correct.

{audio:0:34:19} You mentioned how the supply can be used for both Eats and the ride-hailing business. Do you see a lot of drivers doing that, in using both services, for Uber? Do you think that’s an advantage over the other players?

{audio:0:34:39} I think there are a couple of factors here. Firstly, on the Uber X platform, the car needs to be in a specific condition. The car, in general, when I was in Uber, we were only allowing cars which were manufactured after 2000 or newer cars because, ultimately, the customer is sitting in the car and you need to give them a good experience. On the Eats platform, any kind of car could work. If it is an older car, you are only allowed to deliver on the Eats platform, but if it is a newer car, you have much more flexibility; you can do ride-sharing and you can also do the Eats platform.

{audio:0:35:24} The second factor is, in different markets, the supply could be different. For example, in a dense market, like London, New York, Chicago, etc. or in developing markets, such as Indo-Asia, your supply is totally different. You have many more bikes or motorbikes, who are delivering the Eats order. In an ideal world, if your car is new, and your market is much more driven by motor transportation then you can, potentially, see a lot of drivers driving on both the X platform and the Eats platform.

{audio:0:36:07} Then there is the element of choice. Some drivers like to have people in their car, whilst for some people, that is not their preference. However, there may be a few psychological things, as well, that could be taken into account. We do notice that, yes, there are people who driving on both the platforms.

{audio:0:36:35} What is the break-even number of trips, per hour, for the Eats business, roughly?

{audio:0:36:43} I won’t say that we can define any break-even point. It all depends on what kind of gross margins you want to achieve. The higher gross margin you want to achieve, the higher number of trips you will need in an hour. In general, if you only do one trip, it won’t be as profitable a business. But if you do two trips, I think you will be in a good enough position. Ultimately, the long-term objective would be that you do multiple pick-ups and multiple drop-offs. The idea is that you can pick up multiple items from the same restaurant and you can deliver to multiple people, who are near, so you are not significantly changing the service. Customers expect you to deliver food in 30 to 45 minutes. You cannot significantly change that, but if you can create enough liquidity here and you are able to do multiple pick-ups and multiple drop-offs, then I think you will be in very good shape.

{audio:0:37:54} However, I think that one point to identify here is that, in general, the economics of the Eats business is lower than the ride-sharing business, because it is a three-player marketplace and you are paying drivers, but you are not earning any money from them. You are only making money from the restaurant side. On the eater side, you are only charging a small amount, which is almost negligible. You are making money from the restaurant side, but you are giving a lot of money to the driver. The one biggest factor could be the cloud kitchens, and how you control the pricing. Once you have the cloud kitchen, if it is much more vertically-integrated model, then you can have better economics. That’s why the way to improve your take rate, from 25% to 30% to much higher, would be if you are delivering much more from the cloud kitchen, who may have better unit economics. They may be willing to give you 30% to 40%.

{audio:0:38:54} The long-term evolution of the market would see a vertically-integrated business, as a merging of the cloud kitchen and the delivery business and that is where the better unit economics will come into the picture.

UberX and UberEats: Setting the Take Rate

Core drivers of UberX and UberEATS pricing strategy

How to use price to balance supply and demand in marketplace businesses

How economies of scale will drive Uber’s ride-hailing take rate

Potential pricing strategies for Lyft versus Uber